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world is "the Holy Spirit's power to bring about an earthquake in contemporary 
moral opinion." Understandable though it is, Ramsey 's position is not one that 
commends itself to those who seriously hope to influence and transform society 
rather than merely lament its condition or wait in fear and trembling for God to 
intervene. Moreover, it is hardly the stance of one open to the genuine dialogue 
proposed in the preface. 
We may conclude by quoting from an earlier comment of Richard McCormick: 
"In an excellent book, The Patient as Person, Ramsey's description of the duty of 
caring for the dying is the most beautiful and Christian avai lable." That book , to 
date, has not been improved upon and , hopefully, will continue to overshadow 
this sad exercise in polemics, nit-picking, and intramural sparing. In sum , Ramsey 
still has much to contribute to the ongoing debate in medical:legal ethics, but 
unfortunately, not in this publication which h e promises will be his "last book in 
medical ethics." 
- John J . Paris, S.J. 
Associate Professor of Social Ethics 
Holy Cross College 
TWO VIEWS ON: 
Health Care Ethics 
Benedict M. Ashley, O.P. and Kevin D. O'Rourke, O.P. 
Catholic Hospital Association, 1438 Grand Blvd. , St. Louis, Mo. 63104, 1978. xii 
+ 507 pp, $13.00, soft cover. 
Christian medical practitioners and health care profess ionals stand to benefit 
greatly from this careful and comprehensive study of current m edical-moral and 
bioethical problems written by Fathers Ashley and O'Rourke. Father O ' RoUl'ke is 
the present medical·moral advisor for the Catholic Hospital Association. Father 
Ashley is a professor of moral theology at Aquinas Institute, and was recently 
granted the prestigious Master of Sacred Theology degree from the Dominican 
Order. Both authors are highly skilled theologians, as well as philosoph ers and 
moralists , who have combined their substantial skills to create this comprehensive, 
well organized and well-written study of moral problems in current health care. 
This study thoroughly investigates philosophical, theological and moral aspects of 
bioethical reasoning, abortion, contraception, triage, psychotherapy and pastoral 
care. The primary value of the wOl'k is that it integrates the latest and most 
advanced theological and philosophical developments with moral analyses of prob-
lems in these areas. While it is often difficu lt to distinguish the work of many 
moral theologians from that of bioethicists and medical moralists , the distinctive 
theological character of this work is quite evident. This work is clearly a work of 
moral theology , and it is wl'itten for the ex plicit purpose of providing guidelines 
for Christian health care . 
Of significant value in this work is the notion of human totality and integrity, 
for this principle makes it possibl e to deduce the grounds for the c laim of human 
persons to an a bsolute and unconditional right to life. The integrity of the human 
person rests upon a capacity for integrating ordel's of mean ing, logic and value for 
the purposes of generating richer and more complex orders. The class of pel·sons is 
the only class possessing this active capability of synth es is and integration for that 
purpose. This enables persons to actualize meanings a nd values that are morally 
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protected from positive acts of destruction. The rightful ex istence of these orders 
warrants the absolute and unconditional right of this class of agents to exist, 
regardless of the degree of integration accomplished. This I·ight must exist because 
it necessarily presupposes the unconditionally rightful ex istence of the richer and 
higher orders of value and meaning actualized by the class of persons. 
Ashley and O 'Rourke's work, however , is not without its flaws. The critical 
problem of the cond itions required for the valid ide ntifica tion of the point of 
actua lization of the human person is not sufficiently treated. This is because the 
definition of the hum an person offered is imprecise. The human pe rson is defined 
as "embodied inte llige nt fr eedom " (pp. 10-12) and no spec ific funct ions or oper-
at ions of the person are included in this definition that would permit facile 
identification. It is not log ica lly possib le to identify cl ea rly any specific functions 
entai led by this d efi ni t ion that would mark the point at which the person actual-
izes and terminates. For it is no t analyt ic that personhood actuali zes or terminates 
when freedom or intelligence actualize in an embodi ed form; indeed, personhood 
may exist pl·ior to man 's fully developed physical being, or ex ist after its extinc-
tion. The person is not the embod ime nt of these states, but is the causal subject to 
which these states, in their actualization and termination, are ascr ibed . The person 
is actualized when this causal subject comes to be , and can terminate only when it 
ceases to be. If t he person were identified with embodied intelligent freedom, 
then t he termination of these states would entai l the termination of the person , 
and th is is ev id ently not tl· ue. The person must be ide ntifi ed as the causa l agent of 
these states. 
Questio ns also can be raised about the logical adequacy of the defini tion of 
natural law olTered by Ashley and O'Rourke. They contend that natural law 
prohib itions and prescr iptions are grounded on genel·ali zat ions made from human 
exper ience (p. 167). This does not re rJect the logica l foundations of the natural 
law , because genera lizations from t h e opinions of a com munity concerning the 
moral quality of acts do not e ntail the validity of these judgments. Acts are 
prohibited by natural law, not because of the general experience of humanity , but 
because the exercise of these acts necessarily entails the actualization of morally 
prohibited states of affail·s. Acts are immoral because the causal chain actuali zed 
by them prohibits the highest o l·d ers of value to b e achieved. 
Finally, the discussion of the moral p ermiss ibility of arti fici a l contraception is 
clear and concise, but also not without its faults. Ashley and O'Rourke suggest 
that marital acts performed during sterile pel·iods are indil-ectly and remotely 
OI·dered to procreat ion , while acts of artificial contl·aception are directly and 
proximately conll·ary to procreation (p. 274). This is doubtful, for a close examin-
ation of the necessa ry e ntailments of both of these acts revea ls them to be identi-
cal in the procreative co nditions they entail. It is not logically or practically 
possi bl e for acts of e ither type to be directly or indirec tly, proximately or 
remotely, ordered to procreation. Infertility is necessar ily e ntailed in the per-
formance of both types, and conception is not a foreseen but unintended conse-
quence of e it h er type of act. If a relation of indirection and remote ness existed 
be tween ster il e m ar ita l acts and procreation , then the intervention of external 
causal chains would permit these acts to remain unchanged in their logical struc-
ture whi le causing conception. But that is not the case. AI-tificially contraceptive 
acts cannot be condemned because they entail directly a nd proximately infertile 
marita l acts, for sterile marita l acts entai l the same states of affairs. Alternate 
grounds for prohibiting these acts must be found. 
These are not to be considered as fata l flaws. Health Care Ethics remains an 
extrem ely val uabl e work in the fi e ld that should be in the library of a ll concerned 
with establishing Chl·i st ian hea lth care. 
- Rev. Robert Barry, O.P. 
Providence College 
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Heall h Carl' Ethics, a new text by Benedict Ash ley , O.P. (professor of moral 
theo l o~y at t h e Aquinas Inst itute in Dubuque) a nd Kevin O'Rourke , O.P. (vice 
pres ide nt of t he Catho li c Hospital Assoc iat io n ) has bee n recently published. It is a 
notab le addition to t h e fi e ld of m edica l'mora l li terature in its scope, d eta il , and 
cl a ri ty o f presentatio n . The a ut hors fr a nkl y admit t hat t hey propose a Christ ia n 
and R o m an Cath o li c set of va lues and point o ut that: "Ca tholics reaso n ethica ll y 
in te ml S of a val ue system rooted in a view o f rea li ty given by the Christ ian gospe l, 
interpreted by the Ch urch in its life of faith , a nd author itatively formulated by 
the Pope a nd t he Bishops." They go o n to observe that Catholics accelJ t such 
teac hing w ith re ligio us asse n t, even whe n this lacks th e fin a l authority o f a so le mn 
de fini t io n . They state, however , that this is not m eant to ex clud e an ecum f> nica l 
assessme nt of othe r va lu e systems, by which they hope to ac hieve "an openness to 
the opt ions of othe rs a nd a deepe n ing of our own Ch rist ian and Catholi c ide n-
t ity." And whil e th is assessment is ve ry well done in their text, their evaluat ion of 
anothe r recen t type o f pluralism , w hich claims to re m a in w ithin the param eters of 
Catho li c teaching, seem s to be a bit less percept ive and perhaps too benign . 
But be fore comme nt in g furth e r on that, it sh o uld be st ressed that theil' treat-
ment of the basic dete l'm inants of m ora lity is both espec ia lly good a nd pal,tic -
ularl y needed at t h is tim e when a certa in basic co n fu sio n has becl o uded thi s 
qu est ion. Because these " determin an ts of morality" are part of t h e trad e language 
of et hics a nd moral theo logy a nd because certai n modificat io ns of their accepted 
m eaning is the poin t of d e pal'ture for much of th e confusion we see today, some 
deta il ed com m ent on t h em may prove h elp fu l to those in terested in the m ed ical-
moral field . 
The " detel'minants of morality, " commonl y I'e fe rred to as m oral object, 
m o tive, and circumstances are labels to ide ntify what is t l'u e of any huma n action: 
that som ething is done, for som e reason (o r reasons), in so m e concrete c ircum, 
stances. By moral o bjec t (w hat is done ) is not m ea nt just a ph ysical action , but 
rathel' a physical act ion t hat is suffi cien t ly d etermined as to h ave a n identity in 
the moral order. Thus, for exampl e , "language regarding God" merely d escribes a 
phys ica l act ion which , as a moral objec t , could be e ithe r p rayer , in o n e case, 01' 
blas phe my in anoth e r. Lik ewise "cam al in tercourse" is a physical act io n an d , 
conside red on ly as a physical action withou t any furth er determinati o n has no 
specific identification in t he moral order. But carnal inte rcourse between the 
unmalTied is d esc ribed by the moral term "fornication" (a moral object). Thus t h e 
words "blasphe my " or "fomication " descr ibe not m erely a physical action, but 
rat he r ar ident ifi a ble mOl'al o bject - i.e. , a physical action w ith an intentionali ty 
or a formali ty t hat de termines t he act itself, as ide for a n y m otive for wh ich it is 
done. 
Perhaps t his concept can be somewhat c larified by a bri e f reflection on how 
philosophe rs tal k about t h e finality (and formality) o f things as we ll as actions. A 
thing can have two distinct purposes, one of which is built into it (call ed th e finis 
operis, or the purpose of t he thing itself) a nd this may be d if fe re nt from th e 
purpose of the individual wh o uses it (ca ll ed the fInis operantis, or th e purpose of 
the age nt) . For exa mpl e, a clock is a co llocat ion of m etal an d pl astic pa l' ts con-
structed into a fun ct ional configuration designed 10 indicate the correct time. 
Th at is t he fInis operis o r th e clock. If som eo ne uses the c loc k as a h amm er, to tap 
a thumbtack into a wall , t h e purpose of t h e agent in such a case (finis operantis) 
diffe rs from the finis operis of the clock ( i.e., what t he cloc k is in itse lf and what 
it is des igned to do ). Nonetheless it sti ll remai ns a clock , albe it now bei n g used as 
a h amm e r. In such a case we migh t say that its materiali ty is metal and plast ic , its 
formality is clock, and that the motive or purpose fOl' which one uses it is not 
necessar il y identical with its own internal formality (or built-in intentionali ty). 
Since an action is lik e wise a t hing, as w e conve l' t t h ese te l'ms to the m o ral order 
it is impol'tant to note t hat the " reason why" or t h e "moti ve for which " some-
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body does something (the finis operantis) is not necessarily sufficient to explain 
the finality (finis operis) or formality of the action itself. An action may have its 
own finality , in the moral order, which is quite distinct from the motive for which 
one does it . 
Thus we could say that carnal intercourse, considered only as a physical action, 
is a materiality (an action, considered only in itself, without moral reference or 
specification). When, however, it is extra-marital intercourse (fornication or adul-
tery) it is now said to have a finis operis, which is to say that its physical material-
ity has become a moral formality , no matter who does it, or when , or where, or 
why. Thus a purely physical action (such as language regarding God or carnal 
intercourse) can acquire an intentionality or formality (blasphemy or fornication) 
which is distinct from the motive for which it is done in a particular set of 
circumstances. Such would be referred to as a seriously wrong moral object (finis 
operis - "intrinsically evil" which cannot become good even if done for a good 
motive or under supposedly mitigating circumstances. 
During the 1970 's, however , there has been a revisionist movement among 
some Catholic moral theologians both in Europe and in th e United States which 
seems to discredit any idea of an intrinsically evil moral object, and seeks to 
determine the morality of an action only by a simultaneous conside ration of the 
physical action itself (devoid of any intentionality [moral formality 1 or finis 
operis) together with the finis operantis(the motive for which it is done) and the 
other circumstances of the act . Joseph Fuchs was one of the prime innovators of 
this revisionist movement and, as Ashley and O 'Rourke point out in Health Care 
Ethics, "Fuchs' position implies that no act considered in its intrinsic nature 
solely according to its moral object can be judged ' intrinsically evil' (malum per 
se). Hence h e (Fuchs) logically concludes, we must abandon the classical notion of 
'absolute moral norms' since all moral rules may admit of exception given some 
special combination of object, circumstance and intention" (p. 189). Ashley and 
O ' Rourke, of course, do not agree with this revisionist error, nor do the majority 
of Catholic moral theologians, nor indeed (it is interesting to note), did Fuchs 
himse lf, priOl· to the publication of Humanae Vitae (cf. J . Fuchs , Th eologia 
Moralis Generalis, Rome : Gregorian University Press, 1966 /67). The error of this 
revisionist movement can perhaps bes t be appreciated in its "bottom line," 
reache d last year in a book by Anthony Kosnik et al. where one finds a proposed 
defense for such actions as fornication , adultery, homosexuality , cont,·aception, 
etc. as able to be morally acceptable if done for proper motives a nd under suf-
ficientl y fulfilling or demanding circumstances (A. Kosnik et al., Human Sex-
uality, New York: Paulist Press , 1977). This can scarcely be called Catholic moral 
teaching. 
Whil e it is true that Ashley and O'Rourk e thus propose solidly Catholic prin-
ciples in Health Care Ethics, they seem to weaken somewhat in their treatment of 
the controversial subject of contraception. Although faithfully staying within the 
doctrinal limits of the encyclicals CasU Connubii and Humanae Vitae, they state 
that: " it is clear that these documents do not claim to give a definitive decision 
about a revea led truth of faith or morals, which is all that the first Vatican 
Council declared to be an object of infallibility, a declaration confirmed by the 
second Vatican Council" (p. 270). That statement , as it stands, is simply too 
compressed to be a complete or even adequate statement regarding the force of 
t he Church 's teaching on contraception. Nor is it enough to say , as they do, that 
there may be revea led truths in some encyclicals which "may later be solemnly 
defined" (ibidem). There is not adequate development of the teaching of Vatican 
II that a d e fide d efin ition by a Pope , or even by a Council, is not the only source 
of infallible teaching. Vatican II states that: "Although the individual bishops do 
not enjoy the prerogative of infallibility, they can nevertheless proclaim Christ's 
doctrine infallibly . This is so , even when they are dispersed throughout the world , 
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provided that while maintaining the bond of unity among themselves and with 
Peter's successor, and while teaching authentically on a matter of faith or morals, 
they concur in a single viewpoint as the one which must be held conclusively" 
(Lumen Gentium, no.25). To appreciate the profound significance of that teach-
ing, with regard to the Church's teaching on contraception, one might consult the 
long and scholarly article recently published by John Ford and Germain Grisez 
(Theological Studies, 39:2 , June 1978, pp. 258-312). The final conclusion of 
these two eminent scholars is: "We think there is an extremely strong case for the 
position that the received Catholic teaching on the immorality of contraception 
has been infallibly proposed by the ordinary magisterium" (i.e., by the long 
standing teaching of the bishops in union with the Roman Pontiff as described 
above). 
All of this clearly demonstrates that the teaching of the Church on contracep-
tion is, even if not certainly infallible, certainly more than just encyclical teaching 
and certainly less open to the facile dissent of some theologians which, as the 
Holy See has recently pointed out: " cannot be considered as a 'theological source' 
which the faithful might invoke and thereby abandon the authentic magisterium 
and follow the opinions of private theologians which dissent from it" (Congrega-
tion for the Doctrine of the Faith , Prot. 2027 /69 , March 13, 1975). Ashley and 
O 'Rourke have made a genuine effort to soften the edges of the controversy over 
contraception and blend the various elements of dissent into a ,·easonable syn-
thesis with the teaching of the Church , but the result is more of a compromise 
than a commentary; and fails to ,·eflect the unambiguous teaching of the Church 
in this regard. 
- Rev. Thomas J. O'Donnell, S.J . 
Seminary of St. Pius X 
(Reprinted with permission of Ayd Medical Communications.) 
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Legalized abortion is a topic which 
has polarized Americans and there 
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of national consensus. Because of its 
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of conversation (on the subject) is 
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